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RECENT DECISIONS
question. Since the subject when hypnotized, is under the influence
and will of another, he is not master of his own will and is subject
to hallucinations which may be suggested by the hypnotist. The
validity of such a confession is very questionable.
A confession, extorted from a prisoner in custody through force
or fear, is invalid and must be rejected by the court.1 4 This is also
true where, as an inducement for obtaining a confession, the district
attorney promises the accused freedom from prosecution.15
From the foregoing it can readily be seen that the initial problem
is the determination of whether or not the confession is voluntary.
Some states have adopted the rule that this question is to be decided
by the trial judge, while the majority hold that it falls within the
province of the jury. Since the issue is in reality a question of fact,
it would appear that the majority view is the better one.
T. W. S.
EQUITY - REFORMATION OF DEEDs - MUTUAL MISTAKE OF
FAcT.-The plaintiffs' agents effected a contract of sale for the larger
of two lots owned by the plaintiffs in Tennessee. The secretary of
the plaintiffs' lawyer was instructed by the lawyer to make out the
required deed. Through inadvertence she incorporated the descrip-
tion of both of the lots owned by the plaintiffs, whereas the contract
concerned only the larger. The deed in this form was executed by
the plaintiffs and delivered to the grantee who subsequently trans-
ferred the deed to the defendant herein. When the error was dis-
covered the plaintiffs promptly instituted this suit praying for a decree
divesting defendant of title to the lot erroneously conveyed and re-
vesting title in the plaintiffs. The Chancellor granted the petition
by way of reformation of the deed on the ground of mutual mistake
of fact. Held, affirmed. One of the fountainheads of equitable jur-
isdiction is the reformation of instruments which have been errone-
ously constructed due to a mutual mistake as to some extrinsic fact.
When there is a mistake of fact so fundamental that the minds of
the parties have not met, or where unconscionable advantage has been
gained through mistake, equity will act to protect legal rights and
prevent intolerable injustice provided that the plaintiff has not been
guilty either of gross negligence in effecting the mistake, or of sleep-
ing on his rights, and provided that restitution to status quo is
feasible without interference with intervening rights. Alston v.
Porter, - Tenn. -, 219 S. W. 2d 445 (1949).
24 People v. Barbato, supra note 13.
L5 N. Y. CODF CRIM. PROC. § 395; People v. Reilly, 224 N. Y. 90, 120 N. E.
113 (1918).
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In no jurisdiction is it seriously controverted that equity has
power to reform instruments erroneously constructed due to mutual
mistake of fact.1 However, the power is exercised cautiously and
each case is treated on its own particular facts, for a mistake of fact
is more than a mere error of judgment. In order that equity will
reform an instrument, there must have existed an antecedent agree-
ment as to the terms of the instrument.2  It must be remembered
that equity does not create agreements for parties, but it will perfect
an agreement which has been erroneously integrated into a written
instrument.
If mistake is the only basis for the petition for equitable relief,
then it must be shown that the mistake was mutual.3 However, this
dogma does not exclude cases such as the instant case wherein the
mistake of fact is perpetrated by a scrivener, who represented the
plaintiff. The majority view regards the mutual erroneous assump-
tion of the parties that the instrument which embodies their agree-
ment conforms to that agreement as a mutual mistake of fact.4 The
courts require clear and convincing proof of the existence of the ma-
terial mistake in the instrument, and the petitioner bears a heavy
burden of proof in this respect.5 The plaintiffs here subscribed the
deed, although on its face it conveyed both tracts of land. The
weight of authority is to the effect that this mere omission to read
the contents of an instrument which is the embodiment of a previous
agreement, is no bar to equitable relief against the consequences of
mutual mistake of fact; the omission does not constitute gross care-
lessness as a matter of law.6
The instant case falls well within the pattern established by a
long line of decisions in that it recognizes mutual mistake of fact
as a ground for the reformation of instruments. It is subject to
criticism only because it does not sufficiently indicate the relationship
of the defendant, as a third party, to the original parties to the mis-
take. The intervention of the rights of third parties often is of great
import in reformation cases. 7  Parenthetically, the court also com-
126 A. L. R. 472 (1923).
2 Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1828); Fitch v. Flinn, 198 Iowa
823, 200 N. W. 402 (1924).
3 Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 132 S. E. 442 (1926); Doniol v. Com-
mercial Fire Insurance Co. of the City of New York, 34 N. J. Eq. 30 (1881).
Relief has been afforded in cases where there is unilateral mistake of fact
and fraud or unconscientious conduct. See White and Hamilton Lumber Co.
v. Foster, 157 Ga. 493, 122 S. E. 29 (1924).
4 MacDonald v. Crissey, 215 N. Y. 609, 109 N. E. 609 (1915) ; Born v.
Schrenkeisen, 110 N. Y. 55, 17 N. E. 339 (1888).
5Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 595 (N. Y. 1817).
6 Jamaica Savings Bank v. Taylor, 72 App. Div. 567, 76 N. Y. Supp. 790(2d Dep't 1902); Albany City Savings Institution v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40
(1881)_
7 Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500 (1856); Shelly v. Ersh, 305 Ill. 126, 137
N. E. 106 (1922).
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mits itself to the archaic distinction between mistake of fact and
mistake of law, a dictum unhappily indicative of slavish adherence to
precedent.8
P.F.
JURISDICTION-FEDERAL COURTS-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
-APPLIcATION OF STATE LAw.-Plaintiff, a Tennessee corporation,
sued for commissions allegedly due by reason of a sale of defendant's
real estate located in Mississippi. Suit having been brought in the
United States District Court for Mississippi on the grounds of di-
versity of citizenship, that court found the contract void under
Mississippi law since plaintiff had failed to comply with a state
statute' which required that foreign corporations doing business in
that state file a written power of attorney designating an agent on
whom service of process may be had. The United States Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the contract was not void but only
unenforceable in Mississippi state courts, and the fact that the re-
spondent could not sue in the state courts did not preclude its bring-
ing the action in the federal court sitting in that state. The Court
of Appeals relied on David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club
of America,2 in which a similar prohibition against use of the courts
of the State of New York 3 was held not to bar a non-complying
corporation from bringing its suit in the federal court. "The State
could not prescribe the qualifications of suitors in the courts of the
United States, and could not deprive of their privileges those who
were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States
to resort to the Federal courts for the enforcement of a valid con-
tract." 4 Because of the seeming conflict of that holding with the
recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Angel v.
Bullington,ri a writ of certiorari was granted. Held, judgment re-
versed. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is in
effeet only another court of the state in which it sits. The fact that
8 See Hunt v. Rousmaniere, supra note 2. For the more modern view
concerning mistake of law, see N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 112f; Ryon v. Wana-
maker, 116 Misc. 91, 190 N. Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd, 202 App.
Div. 848, 194 N. Y. Supp. 977 (2d Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 545, 139 N. E.
728 (1923).
' MISS. CODE ANN. § 5319 (1942), which also provides, "... any foreign
corporation failing to comply with the above provisions shall not be permitted
to bring or maintain any action or suit in any of the courts of this state."
2225 U. S. 489 (1912).
3 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 218.
4 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U. S. 489,
500 (1912).
5330 U. S. 183 (1947). For an interesting discussion of this case see
Note, 21 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 184 (1947).
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